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Abstract 
After pressure from shareholder activists, proxy advisory firms, and the New York Stock 
Exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission has eliminated uninstructed broker voting in 
director elections. We observe that average director approval rates remain high after the change 
in regulation, while the probability of a director being voted off the board remains low. In 
addition, we find no evidence of significant wealth effects of the change in regulation. We do 
find that firms are increasingly letting shareholders ratify their auditors after the change in 
regulation, which helps in establishing a quorum. 
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I. Introduction 
On the 1st of July in 2009, the SEC approved a proposal by the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) to ban broker votes from director elections to be effective from 2010.1 
Previously, brokers were allowed to cast votes in place of their clients in uncontested director 
elections if they had not received voting instructions from their clients prior to the annual 
meeting. Because brokers typically cast discretionary votes in favor of management (Bethel and 
Gillan, 2002), a number of outside parties, including shareholder activists, proxy advisory firms, 
and the NYSE, were putting pressure on the SEC for new regulation that eliminates uninstructed 
broker votes to create more accountable boards and to improve corporate governance. For 
example, the institutional investor CalPERS asked the SEC already in June 2007 to immediately 
eliminate uninstructed broker voting and subsequently expressed its disappointment at the SEC’s 
failure to act on the issue.2 Similarly, in 2009 the Council of Institutional Investors stated in a 
letter to the SEC that “this long overdue reform is needed now more than ever” and proxy 
advisor firms Glass Lewis and ISS were also strongly supporting the rule change.3 In addition, 
the SEC was exposed to political pressure by the U.S. House of Representatives: During a 
hearing before the House Committee on Financial Services on June 26, 2007, Representative 
Watt asked then SEC Chairman Christopher Cox to present a timetable for the approval of the 
rule change and whether regulation would be in place by the next proxy season.4  
The issue received intensive media coverage. In 2009, shortly before the rule change 
                                                 
1 The final release by the SEC is available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2009/34-60215.pdf. 
 
2  Correspondence from CalPERS with the SEC can be found at http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nyse-2006-
92/nyse200692-7.pdf. 
 
3 See http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nyse-2006-92/nyse200692.shtml. ISS demanded already in 2003 that broker 
votes be abolished (see http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/iss121803.htm). 
 
4 See http://www.shareholdercoalition.com/marketoversighthearingtranscript.pdf. 
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came into effect, the Financial Times (Goodman, 2009) noted that “directors need to take a deep 
breath because they are facing a fundamental shake-up in corporate governance,” referring to the 
combined effect of the broker voting rule change and the increasing adoption of majority voting 
standards by firms. Already in 2007, the Wall Street Journal (Scannell, 2007) wrote that 
“investors … may soon get a boost, as the role of shareholder votes cast by brokers comes under 
closer scrutiny.” One of the leading business law blogs suggested that the adoption of the 
amendment “is the biggest of the reforms that companies face - bigger than proxy access, say-on-
pay, etc.”5 
The statements in the financial media might be exaggerations. Shareholder approval rates 
in uncontested director elections have historically been very high: Cai et al. (2009) show that 
approval rates for directors generally exceed 90%, even at underperforming firms. The exclusion 
of a relatively small percentage of votes – in our sample broker votes are on average 12% of the 
votes cast – seems unlikely to significantly change the outcomes of director elections, especially 
as the “in favor” discretionary votes by brokers are not likely to be replaced by “against votes,” 
but by retail investors not voting at all. Opponents of the change in regulation have therefore 
argued that the main effect of the rule is to raise proxy solicitation costs, without providing any 
substantial advantages. 
Ultimately, whether the change of broker voting regulation is beneficial to shareholders is 
an empirical question. We document the effect of the changed rule on voting outcomes for S&P 
500 firms. In 2009, before the rule change came into effect, the average approval rate for 
directors is 93%. We calculate the synthetic approval rate in 2009 had broker votes been 
excluded. Following Cai et al. (2009), our computation proceeds on the assumption that brokers 
                                                 
5 See The Big Kahuna: SEC Approves NYSE’s Elimination of Broker Discretionary Voting, TheCorporateCounsel.net 
Blog, July 2, 2009. 
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cast their discretionary votes in favor of management and that investors who did not provide 
their broker with instructions in 2009 would not have voted if the rule change had been in place, 
or would have voted in a similar manner as other shareholders. We find that without broker votes, 
the average approval rate would have been 92% in 2009, which seems a very marginal decrease. 
The reason that an average of 12% of broker votes only leads to an average 1% decrease in 
approval rates is that broker votes will be excluded from both the numerator and the denominator: 
ଽଷିଵଶ
ଵ଴଴ିଵଶ = 92%. More importantly, when examining actual election outcomes in 2010 and 2011, 
we find that the change in broker discretionary voting regulation has no significantly negative 
effect on director approval rates, and we find no increased probability that a particular director is 
voted off the board after the rule change. We estimate that on average only 14% of the non-
instructing shareholders in 2009 vote in 2010. 
Of course, it could be that the new regulation affects voting outcomes further in the future, 
or that the change in regulation is value relevant for firms in other ways, for example by 
improving the effort exercised by directors to act in shareholders’ best interests.  To examine the 
possibility that the change in regulation is value relevant for firms in other ways, we study the 
effect of the elimination of discretionary broker voting on shareholder value. The importance of 
this analysis follows from Cai et al. (2009), who provide evidence that voting behavior in 
uncontested elections can have significant effects on for example CEO compensation and 
turnover, even if it does not lead to the removal of directors. We examine shareholder wealth 
effects on nine key event dates during the regulatory process that led to the elimination of broker 
voting. In assessing the market response of the S&P 500 firms to the events, we consider two 
control groups, which are a global market index (from which we exclude U.S. stocks) and the 
returns of firms registered under the Investment Act of 1940. The latter type of firms were 
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exempted from the rule change due to an amendment filed by the NYSE with the SEC on May 
27, 2007. We do not find overall wealth effects of the ban using either of the two benchmarks. 
We further examine the possibility that the rule change is value relevant for a subset of 
firms in our sample. In a cross-sectional analysis we employ several proxies for the potential 
relevance of the rule change for firms. These proxies are the percentage of broker discretionary 
votes, average director approval rates, institutional ownership, whether or not the firm had a 
majority voting standard, the entrenchment index, return on assets, firm size, and industry 
competitiveness. We do not find convincing effects of these variables on abnormal returns. We 
also study firms with a relatively high number of shareholders that explicitly ask the SEC to 
eliminate broker votes. We find that shareholders of firms with more broker votes are more likely 
to express their preference for the elimination of broker votes, but we find no convincing 
evidence that firms have differential abnormal returns when more of their shareholders express 
support for the new rule. We further focus on a sample of 600 small cap stocks. Again, we find 
no convincing evidence that the rule change affects overall abnormal returns or voting behavior. 
As the change in Rule 452 makes uncontested director elections a non-routine matter, 
broker discretionary votes will not count for a quorum if shareholders can only vote on the 
election of directors. The rule change therefore complicates reaching a quorum. However, Rule 
452 does allow broker discretionary voting on routine matters, such as the ratification of 
independent auditors. We find that firms have increased the number of items on the ballot since 
2009. In fact, the percentage of firms with auditor ratification on their ballot after the change in 
regulation is 99%, which mitigates any difficulties caused by Rule 452 to obtain a quorum. 
Our results raise questions about the role that different actors play in the initiation and 
adoption of regulation. Many market participants, notably shareholder activists and proxy advi-
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sory firms, strongly supported the rule change from its beginning and exerted pressure on the 
SEC to adopt it. The rule’s apparent futility suggests that it may be of interest to study in more 
detail the incentives and potential biases in decision making within these organizations regarding 
regulation. Rather than being unbiased agents for shareholders, these institutions may have in-
centives to pursue or advocate policies to enhance their own public visibility or perceived disci-
plinary role. Belinfanti (2009) argues that proxy advisory firms do not have appropriate incen-
tives to act in the best interest of investors because they benefit from high barriers to entry in the 
proxy advisory market and bear no risk from providing bad recommendations. McCall (2011) 
stresses the possibility that proxy advisory firms respond to incentives such as the generation of 
consulting revenue and to demonstrate vigilance to subscribers and politicians. A desire of proxy 
advisory firms and shareholder activists to demonstrate vigilance could explain why they strong-
ly support changes in regulation, even if these are likely to be ineffective. 
Our results also raise the question to what extent the SEC’s actions are distorted by out-
side pressure, which relates to the political-economy approach to financial regulation that at-
tempts to provide a positive analysis of the evolution of regulations (see Kroszner, 2000). Our 
findings suggest that it is interesting to open the black box of the SEC and examine more closely 
its motivations in the design of governance regulation. This topic has not received much attention 
in the corporate governance literature. A notable exception is Choi et al. (2012), who provide 
evidence that the SEC may have misallocated enforcement resources to less efficient investiga-
tive activities due to news coverage and media frenzy on option backdating. Their results raise 
the question how the media, in turn, allocates its attention and resources and which distortion 
may arise in this context. In a time when the SEC and its supporters recurrently complain about 
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the lack of resources devoted by Congress to the SEC’s mission of investor protection, 6 evidence 
on the effectiveness of SEC regulation is of the highest importance. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses regulation of 
broker discretionary voting and Section III outlines our hypotheses. Section IV describes the data 
and presents descriptive statistics. Section V presents the empirical results related to voting 
outcomes, whereas Sections VI and VII focus on wealth effects. Section VIII concludes. 
 
II. Broker Voting and Changes in Regulation 
 Shareholders can hold shares in a company in two different ways, either directly, as the 
record holder, or indirectly, through their broker or bank. In the latter case, the shareholder is 
referred to as the beneficial holder and the broker is said to hold the securities in “street name.” 
This distinction plays an important role for voting at annual shareholder meetings. Rule 452 of 
the New York Stock Exchange allows brokers to cast votes on behalf of their shareholders on 
“routine” proposals under the condition that they have not received voting instructions from their 
clients.7 These discretionary votes are often referred to as “broker votes.” Historically, broker 
votes tend to be cast in favor of management proposals (Bethel and Gillan, 2002). 
 For many years, the uncontested election of directors was considered to be a “routine” 
matter by the NYSE. This changed on July 1, 2009, when the SEC approved a NYSE rule 
change that made uncontested director elections a “non-routine” matter, thus eliminating broker 
votes in all director elections. The rule change became effective for annual meetings on or after 
                                                 
6 See, for instance, the recent article SEC’s Schapiro Rings Alarm about Budget Woes in the Wall Street Journal 
(Holzer, 2011).   
 
7  NYSE Rule 452 lists a plethora of “non-routine” matters on which brokers cannot vote in the absence of 
instructions from clients such as contested director elections and proposals related to a merger or consolidation. 
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January 1, 2010. Companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 were 
exempted. 
We identify 9 events relevant to changes in the regulation of broker voting. Following 
Schipper and Thompson (1983), we define an event as one that either significantly changes the 
market's expectation of likely outcomes or alters the market's expectation of a specific outcome. 
 Our first event corresponds to regulation of broker voting garnering attention in 2003. 
According to a detailed article in the Wall Street Journal (Plitch, 2003) on July 30, 2003 (event 
#1), the issue of broker voting has “landed on the Securities and Exchange Commission's radar 
screen.” 
On November 17, 2004 (event #2), Dow Jones Newswires (Plitch, 2004) reports that the 
NYSE is considering a reform of its proxy voting system. According to the article, the exchange 
was considering creating a working group to revisit its broker voting rule. The rule had attracted 
much public attention and criticism in connection with the director election at the 2004 annual 
meeting of Walt Disney. Despite of a high profile “vote no” campaign by pension fund CalPERS, 
proxy adviser Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and other shareholders, the CEO of 
Disney, Michael Eisner, was reelected to the board with 55% of the votes cast. In the view of 
many commenters, Mr. Eisner would have only received 45% of the votes and failed to garner a 
majority if broker votes had been disallowed.  
In April 2005 the NYSE established the Proxy Working Group (PWG) with the mandate 
to review the exchange's proxy voting process in general and in particular Rule 452 on broker 
voting. Because the NYSE rule on broker voting is a member rule, a rule change would affect not 
only companies listed on the NYSE, but also companies whose stock is held for customers by 
member firm broker-dealers. The Proxy Working Group was composed of members from various 
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NYSE constituencies – including representatives from listed companies, institutional investors, 
lawyers and NYSE member organizations – and held its first meeting on April 25, 2005 (event 
#3). 
The Working Group published a report on June 5, 2006 (event #4), recommending that 
the NYSE amend Rule 452 to make the election of directors a “non-routine” matter, thus 
eliminating broker votes in director elections.8 The report explains that “directors are simply too 
important to the corporation for their election to ever be considered routine.” The publication of 
the report was seen by the media as an important indication that a rule change might occur.9 The 
report also included several other recommendations. The Working Group advised the NYSE to 
undertake significant effort to further educate investors about the importance of voting and to 
improve the ability of issuers to communicate with shareholders. These measures were 
considered to be a crucial complement to the elimination of the broker vote. For example, with 
regard to investor education the report noted that “any plan to amend Rule 452 ... must include as 
a critical component a large scale education effort to inform shareholders about the mechanics of 
the proxy voting process.” 
On October 24, 2006 (event #5), the board of the NYSE adopted the recommendations of 
its Working Group and filed a proposed rule change with the SEC to amend Rule 452 to 
eliminate broker discretionary voting for the election of directors.10 The exchange asked for the 
amendment to go into effect for annual meetings held on or after January 1, 2008. The filing was 
                                                 
8 The Working Group Report is available at: http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/REVISED_NYSE_Report_6_5_06.pdf. 
 
9 An article in the Wall Street Journal (Plitch, 2006) states: “If the past is any guide, the NYSE's decision to publish 
an advisory group's report is likely to lead to a rule change.”  
 
10 In the following years the initial proposal was amended four times. Notably, on May 23, 2007, the exchange filed 
an amendment to exempt companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 from the rule change. 
 
 
 
9 
 
widely reported as a step towards the elimination of broker voting.11 On this occasion, the 
Chairman of the Working Group, Larry Sonsini, exhorted the NYSE to act on the Group’s other 
proposals as well: “The amendment to Rule 452 should not be viewed in a vacuum. It is critical 
that the other recommendations of my Committee be implemented, particularly in the areas of 
investor education … and with respect to the ability of issuers to communicate with the 
beneficial owner of the shares.” 
In the following year, the reform process slowed down. Dow Jones Newswire 
(Whitehouse, 2007) reported on September 27, 2007 (event #6) that the NYSE had put on hold 
any plans to eliminate the broker vote. The day before, the NYSE had sent a letter to listed 
companies informing them that the rule change has been delayed by the SEC and will not 
become effective for the 2008 proxy season: “Based on recent conversations with SEC staff 
members, we learned that our proposed rule filing is being considered by the Commission as part 
of a broader range of issues relating to shareholder communications and proxy access. As a result, 
our rule filing will not be approved for the 2008 proxy season.” 
On May 21, 2008 (event #7), a detailed article on Dow Jones Newswire (Burns, 2008) 
reported that the elimination of broker voting seems to be “stuck at the SEC.” A vice president 
with the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals is quoted with the 
prediction that the NYSE proposal “may die.” The article also quotes Charles Elson, director of 
the Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance, who believes that the 2008 Presidential election 
could keep the SEC sidelined until a new President names a new SEC chair: “I think we're in one 
giant holding pattern. Come February or March of next year, it may be a different situation.”    
The situation indeed changed after Mary Schapiro was appointed by President Barack 
                                                 
11 See, for instance, NYSE Moves to Bar Broker Votes in Board Elections, Associated Press (Oct. 24, 2006); NYSE 
Moves to End Broker Voting for Directors, Reuters (Oct. 24, 2006). 
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Obama as SEC Chairperson in the beginning of 2009, when the SEC published the proposed rule 
change for comment on February 26, 2009 (event #8).12 The Commission received 153 comment 
letters. On the one hand, explicit support was expressed by many activist investors and proxy 
advisory firms, e.g. CalPERS, TIAA-CREF, and Glass Lewis. On the other hand, opposition 
mainly came from the representatives of listed companies.13 
On July 1, 2009 (event #9), the rule was approved by the SEC and became effective for 
annual meetings on or after January 1, 2010. The proposal received the support of the three 
Democratic members of the Commission, while the two Republican members opposed it. 14  
 
[Table I here ] 
 
III. Hypotheses 
We distinguish three hypotheses about the effect of the elimination of broker voting on 
voting outcomes and shareholder value. 
Our first hypothesis is based on the SEC pursuing the rule for reasons other than the 
maximization of investor welfare. Choi et al. (2012) argue that the SEC pursued more marginal 
cases of option backdating over time, after the practice received considerable media attention. 
They find that later SEC backdating investigations are less likely to be accompanied by parallel 
criminal investigations and more likely to be terminated without producing monetary penalties, 
and they conclude that scandal-driven media attention led the SEC to move away from non-
                                                 
12 The SEC’s notice of filing of the proposed rule change is available at: http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2009/34-
59464.pdf. 
 
13 For all comment letters on the proposed rule, see http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nyse-2006-
92/nyse200692.shtml. 
 
14 The SEC consists of five Commissioners who are appointed by the President of the United States. By law, no 
more than three members can be from the same political party.  
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option backdating related accounting issues. Macey (2008) is also critical about the SEC, arguing 
that it has no meaningful market incentives to implement corporate governance rules that 
maximize shareholder value, but does have incentives to protect its turf and increase its budgets. 
The budget of the SEC is funded through annual appropriations enacted by Congress and the 
President and it can vary significantly from year to year.15 For instance, the budget was nearly 
doubled from 2001 to 2004 following the governance scandals at Enron, Worldcom and others. 
This dependency may give considerable influence over regulation to the preferences or 
ideologies of legislative majorities or the interests of their constituencies. A potential 
politicization of the regulatory process is suggested by the voting behavior of the Commission's 
members. In absence of unanimity, the different members frequently vote along political party 
lines. According to Jeff Morgan, President of the National Investor Relations Institute, the 
heightened politicization of financial regulators will lead to “3-2 voting becoming a trend for the 
Schapiro-led SEC as it appears Commissioners are lining up with party affiliation with the three 
Democratic Commissioners having the majority vote.”16 
Following the above arguments, and given that director approval rates are historically 
very high at uncontested director elections (Cai et al., 2009), our first hypothesis is that the 
elimination of broker voting has no discernible effects on voting outcomes and firm value. Even 
if the ban led to a change in voting behavior and to greater director accountability, the impact 
may have been too modest to result in a change in firm values. After all, only uncontested 
elections are affected, which are by definition limited in the degree to which they can improve 
governance.  
                                                 
15 See the SEC Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2010-2015, p. 8 
 
16 See http://www.niri.org/Main-Menu-Category/advocate/Presidents-Note/Schapiro-Leadership-Shuffle.aspx 
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Our second hypothesis predicts positive wealth effects. Proponents of the rule change 
argue that the elimination of broker votes makes boards of directors more accountable to 
shareholders. In turn, greater director accountability and better corporate governance should 
mitigate the agency costs that arise due to the separation of ownership and control and should 
thus add value to public corporations (Bebchuk, 2005). Starting point of the argument is the 
observation that brokers, unlike shareholders, have no economic interest in the companies in 
which they cast discretionary votes. Hence, they cannot be expected to act in the best interest of 
shareholders. Indeed, the fact that brokers generally vote with management is seen as evidence of 
a distorted election process that fails to hold directors accountable. Under the second hypothesis, 
the elimination of broker votes leads to more competitive elections that can increase firm value 
by strengthening directors' incentives to monitor their firm and to get involved with 
management.17 
Our third hypothesis is based on several theories that suggest that empowering 
shareholders through stronger voting rights may in fact reduce the value of the firm. These 
papers share the basic idea that managerial discretion can be beneficial and that too much 
influence by outside investors is undesirable. For example, Burkart et al. (1997) argue that 
managers have stronger incentives to show initiative and to exert effort when shareholders' 
influence is restricted. If outside investors have too much power, they cannot commit to reward 
the manager through private benefits. Similarly, Almazan and Suarez (2003) propose that a weak 
                                                 
17 In particular, an undistorted election system may result in closer monitoring because it reinforces the reputational 
concerns of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983). For instance, board members may be more willing to curb excessive 
CEO pay if they are rewarded in a visible manner through higher approval rates at the annual meeting. See Adams et 
al. (2010) for a comprehensive survey of studies on board of directors. In addition to the incentive channel, the rule 
change might enhance performance by facilitating the removal or blocking of unsuitable or incompetent directors, 
notably in firms with majority voting standards. These considerations are echoed in letters sent to the SEC by market 
participants during the comment period. For instance, the Council of Institutional Investors notes that “uninstructed 
broker votes distort elections” and that “broker voting often masks significant shareowner dissatisfaction.” 
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board can be desirable because it allows investors to commit to a more lenient firing policy. This 
strengthens the manager's incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital. Adams and Ferreira 
(2007) explore the idea that close board monitoring might be costly, because it compromises the 
advisory role of the board. Akyol et al. (2012) and Larcker et al. (2011) study the wealth effects 
of attempts by the SEC to facilitate shareholder proxy access and find a negative effect on 
shareholder wealth. In our context, these theories suggest that the elimination of broker votes 
may be costly for shareholders.18 In addition to these agency-based considerations, the rule 
change might be value reducing because it increases the proxy solicitation costs for companies 
since it forces them to devote more resources to communicating with shareholders and to 
soliciting votes in order to obtain a quorum. 
 
IV. Data and Summary Statistics 
 Our sample consists of firms that are part of the S&P 500 stock market index at the end 
of 2009. We require these 500 firms to report their industry classification, firm size and return on 
assets in Compustat, their stock returns in CRSP, their institutional holdings in Thomson Reuters’ 
13F filings database, their voting standard for director elections and their anti-takeover 
provisions in RiskMetrics, and their voting results for director elections in the company filings 
database of SEC Edgar.19 This leaves us with a sample of 457 firms. 
 
                                                 
18 This concern was also expressed in many comment letters to the SEC. For example, the law firm Wachtell, Lipton, 
Rosen & Katz writes that “the proposed NYSE rule change is likely to magnify the already significant influence of 
institutional investors, activist shareholders and proxy solicitation firms, further constraining boards of directors 
from exercising independent business judgment on behalf of all shareholders.” 
 
19 In 2009, the voting results typically appear in the first 10-Q filing after the annual meeting. For the years 2010 and 
2011, the voting results can typically be found in Section 5.07 of the 8-K filings. We search for filings until 31-8-
2011.   
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[Table II here ] 
 
Table II reports descriptive statistics of the firms in our sample for the 2009 fiscal year. 
On average, the aggregate number of shareholder votes at the annual meeting is 554 million 
votes per firm. The percentage of broker discretionary votes is the number of broker 
discretionary votes divided by total votes cast. When we are unable to find the number of broker 
discretionary votes in 2009, we use the number of non-instructing shareholders in 2010.20 We 
find that, on average, broker discretionary votes represent 12% of the votes cast. The maximum 
percentage of broker discretionary votes in 2009 is 44% and belongs to Citigroup. 
The approval rate is the percentage of votes that is cast in favor of a particular director. 
We divide the number of shares voted in favor by the total number of votes cast, which includes 
withheld votes.21 We calculate the average approval rate per firm. Because the change in Rule 
452 had not been in effect in 2009, broker discretionary votes are included in the reported 
approval rate. We find that the average approval rate per company in 2009 is 93%, with a 
minimum of 49% and a maximum of 100%. 
We also calculate the synthetic approval rates for 2009, which reflects the estimated 
approval rate of a firm had broker votes been excluded. Following Cai et al. (2009), we adjust 
both the numerator and the denominator, and calculate the synthetic approval rate in 2009 as: 
                                                 
20 The number of broker discretionary votes can be missing, even when we are able to locate the overall voting 
results, because firms are not required to report the number of discretionary broker votes when all items on the ballot 
are “routine” matters. Since uncontested director elections were considered “routine” in 2009, a limited number of 
firms only had routine matters on the 2009 ballot and hence do not report the number of broker discretionary votes. 
When we obtain the number of non-instructing shareholders (“broker non-votes”) from 2010, we calculate the 
percentage of broker discretionary votes by dividing the number of non-instructing shareholders in 2010 by the sum 
of total votes cast and the number of non-instructing shareholders in that year. 
 
21 When a vote is withheld, a shareholder explicitly marks a proxy card as “withheld” for a particular director. 
Including withheld votes in calculating approval rates is in line with the measure most companies use to decide and 
report election results (see, for example, Cai et al., 2009). 
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synthetic	approval	rate ൌ 	 ሺaverage	approval	rate	x	votes	castሻ	– 	broker	discr. votesvotes	cast	– 	broker	discretionary	votes .			ሺ1ሻ 
We find that the average synthetic approval rate for 2009 is about 92%.  
The synthetic decrease in approval rate is the difference between the actual average 
approval rate for a firm in 2009 and the synthetic approval rate in 2009 for that firm. The average 
synthetic decrease in approval rates is only about 1 percentage point. The maximum synthetic 
decrease in approval rate is 11% for the directors of Citigroup in 2009, and would indicate an 
average approval rate of 75% rather than 86%. 
Table II also reports general firm characteristics. Firm size is the size of total assets, 
reported in millions of dollars. Return on assets is calculated as the ratio of operating income 
before depreciation to total assets. It can be seen that the typical firm in our sample has total 
assets of about $12 billion and a return on assets of 11.8%. For our measure of institutional 
ownership we use the 13F filings database, which provides institutional holdings for institutional 
investment managers who exercise investment discretion over $100 million or more. We obtain a 
firm’s institutional ownership by dividing the sum of the shares held by institutional investment 
managers by total shares outstanding at the 2009 fiscal year-end. On average, institutions hold 
about 85% of our firms’ shares. 
The entrenchment index, which is proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2009), counts the number 
of provisions a firm has out of the following six: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw 
amendments, limits to amend charter, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority 
requirements for mergers. We obtain the information from RiskMetrics and find that the typical 
firm in our sample has three of these provisions in place. Some firms have all provisions in place, 
indicating high managerial entrenchment, while other firms use none of these provisions and 
have low managerial entrenchment. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is the sum of the squared 
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market shares of firms based on total sales and three-digit SIC codes, and is a measure of 
industry competitiveness. The average Herfindahl-Hirschman index score for the firms in our 
sample is 0.187. 
  We further construct a variable representing the voting standard that firms have for 
director elections. One voting standard is a plurality standard, in which directors receiving the 
largest number of votes are elected. Under a plurality standard, a director can be selected with 
one single shareholder vote in an uncontested election. An alternative voting system gaining 
popularity in the wake of SOX is a majority voting standard (see Cai et al., 2010), in which 
directors are elected if they receive more than 50% of the votes. A third voting standard, 
introduced by Pfizer in 2005, combines a plurality voting standard with a resignation policy. 
Under this standard, directors that do not obtain a majority are required to tender their 
resignation. The board (usually by a committee of independent directors) will then decide 
whether to accept the resignation or whether to take some other action appropriately responsive 
to the shareholder vote. 
Our majority voting variable equals one for a majority voting standard, zero for a 
plurality voting standard, and 0.5 for a plurality-plus-resignation voting standard. In our sample, 
271 firms have a majority voting standard in 2009, while 64 firms have a plurality standard that 
includes a director resignation policy. The remaining 122 firms have a plurality standard without 
a director resignation policy, which leads our majority voting variable to have an average of 
0.663 (i.e. ଶ଻ଵ	୶	ଵ	ା	଺ସ	୶	଴.ହ	ା	ଵଶଶ	୶	଴ସହ଻ ). 
 
V. Voting Outcomes 
In this section we examine the actual voting outcomes after Rule 452 has been in effect. 
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Although we already calculated the synthetic change in voting outcomes, the actual change in 
voting outcomes after 2009 might be different for several reasons. First, shareholders might have 
increased the attention they pay to director elections as the change in Rule 452 has increased the 
impact of one vote. Second, directors might have changed their behavior. The change in Rule 
452 empowers shareholders in the director election process, and directors might have increased 
their efforts to act in the best interest of shareholders. Third, the voting outcomes of the 2009 
annual meetings are likely to have been affected by the loss in shareholder value during the year 
preceding the annual meeting, in which the world went through a global financial crisis. 
We collect voting outcomes after the change in Rule 452 by examining company filings 
in the SEC Edgar database for the annual meetings during 2010 and 2011. We search until 31-8-
2011, i.e. we do not have the voting outcomes for firms that hold their annual meeting in the 
third or fourth quarter of 2011. We only consider firms for which we could find voting outcomes 
for all of the years 2009, 2010, and 2011, which are 407 firms.   
 
[ Table III here ] 
 
Panel A of Table III compares the voting outcomes in 2009 with those in the years 2010 
and 2011. The average approval rate of the 407 firms’ directors on the ballot is 92.8% in 2009, 
94.9% in 2010, and 95.2% in 2011. Hence, we observe no decrease in approval rates after the 
change in Rule 452. In fact, the increase in approval rates in annual meetings after 2009 is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. A first likely explanation for this increase is that the 
financial crisis had put pressure on the results of many companies in the year prior to the 2009 
annual meeting, which is likely to have reduced shareholders’ approval of the directors and their 
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strategies. A second, non-mutually exclusive explanation could be that directors have increased 
their attempts to create shareholder value after the change in Rule 452. Of course, it has to be 
noted that the economic significance of the difference in approval rates between 2009 and 2010-
2011 is relatively small. Average director approval is very high both before and after the change 
in Rule 452. 
 There are several directors that would probably not have obtained a majority of votes if 
broker discretionary votes had not been counted in 2009. For example, James Prowse and Scott 
Romney of Compuware Corporation received about 116 million votes in favor of their election 
during the 2009 uncontested director election, out of 206 million votes cast. Because there were 
32 million discretionary broker votes, and assuming these were all cast in favor of the directors, 
the approval rate after the change in Rule 452 would have been ଵଵ଺ିଷଶଶ଴଺ିଷଶ ൌ 48%. We therefore 
examine whether the number of directors failing to obtain a majority of votes has increased after 
Rule 452 has been in effect. Table III shows that in each year, shareholders vote on about eight 
directors per firm. About half a percent of the directors being voted on in 2009 receive a minority 
of votes (12 directors in total). During the 2010 and 2011 annual meetings, this percentage is 
even lower (0.019% and 0.386%, respectively). Apparently, it is very rare for a director to be 
voted down irrespective of broker discretionary votes being excluded. 
The average number of votes cast decreases from 537 million in 2009 to 495 million in 
2010. This decrease seems substantial, but the difference between 2009 and 2010-2011 is not 
statistically significant. To provide more information on the effect of the rule change on the 
number of votes cast, we construct a variable representing the estimated percentage of 
shareholders that transfer from being non-instructing to being instructing after the rule change. 
We construct this variable per firm as 
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௕௥௢௞௘௥	௩௢௧௘௦	௜௡	ଶ଴଴ଽ	௫	ೞ೓ೌೝ೐ೞ	೚ೠ೟ೞ೟ೌ೙೏೔೙೒	೔೙	మబభబೞ೓ೌೝ೐ೞ	೚ೠ೟ೞ೟ೌ೙೏೔೙೒	೔೙	మబబవ	ି	௡௢௡	௜௡௦௧௥௨௖௧௜௡௚	௦௛௔௥௘௛௢௟ௗ௘௥௦	௜௡	ଶ଴ଵ଴
௕௥௢௞௘௥	௩௢௧௘௦	௜௡	ଶ଴଴ଽ	௫	ೞ೓ೌೝ೐ೞ	೚ೠ೟ೞ೟ೌ೙೏೔೙೒	೔೙	మబభబೞ೓ೌೝ೐ೞ	೚ೠ೟ೞ೟ೌ೙೏೔೙೒	೔೙	మబబవ
. That is, we calculate 
the difference between the expected number of broker votes in 2010 when the rule would not 
have been changed and the actual number of non-instructing shareholders in 2010, and we divide 
this by the expected number of broker votes in 2010 when the rule would not have been 
changed.22 If all non-instructing shareholders in 2009 decide to vote after the rule change, then 
non-instructing shareholders in 2010 equals zero and we obtain a percentage of 100%. If the rule 
change did not increase the propensity to vote for non-instructing shareholders, we obtain a 0% 
outcome. If we find an estimate of 10%, then this indicates that 10% of the shareholders who 
would have been classified as non-instructing before the rule change, while controlling for 
overall number of shares outstanding, would actually vote after the rule change. Figure 1 shows a 
histogram of the percentage of otherwise non-instructing shareholders that do vote in 2010. 
 
[  Figure 1 here ] 
 
If all non-instructing shareholders from 2009 would vote in 2010, we expect to see many 
observations in the 100% bin. Instead, we observe that more than 60% of the observations cluster 
close to the 20% bin, indicating that in those firms about 20% of the non-instructing shareholders 
in 2009 vote on uncontested director elections in 2010. Although there is noise in the analysis, 
with some observations below 0%, the results suggest that non-instructing shareholders who 
were represented by the broker vote in 2009 are not highly likely to cast their votes in 2010. The 
average (median) percentage of non-instructing shareholders in 2009 that do vote in 2010 is 14% 
                                                 
22 Even though broker votes in uncontested director elections had been eliminated after 2009, firms have kept 
reporting the number of shareholders who do not provide voting instructions to their brokers. 
 
 
20 
 
(15%). 
Panel B of Table III examines changes in the frequency of vote no campaigns. A vote no 
campaign occurs when an activist investor or proxy advisory firm recommends that fellow 
shareholders vote against one or more directors at the annual meeting. Del Guercio et al. (2008) 
provide evidence that this type of activism can improve firm performance and corporate 
governance.23 The elimination of broker voting could facilitate the waging of such campaigns. In 
our sample, vote no campaigns occur at three firms in 2009, at seven firms in 2010, and at one 
firm in 2011. Hence, there is an increase in the first year after the rule change and a drop 
thereafter. One possible explanation for the decline in 2011 might be the concurrent increase in 
advisory votes on executive compensation that gave shareholders an alternative, more targeted, 
channel to express any potential dissatisfaction with directors. Overall, however, the probability 
of a vote no campaign being initiated is relatively low, and there is no statistically significant 
difference in the probability of a vote no campaign before and after the rule change.  
 Several comment letters indicate that the proposed NYSE Rule 452 complicates reaching 
a quorum. As the change in Rule 452 makes uncontested director elections a non-routine matter, 
broker discretionary votes will not count for a quorum if shareholders can only vote on the 
election of directors. A comment letter by Astoria Financial notes that “for many public 
companies, broker voting remains the most efficient means to obtain a quorum for shareholder 
meetings.” A comment letter by BB&T states that because of the change “we would be forced to 
hire a proxy solicitor to solicit sufficient votes to establish a quorum at each shareholder meeting, 
including those with only proposals that historically have been considered non-controversial. 
Engaging a proxy solicitor generates a considerable expense that is ultimately borne by our 
                                                 
23 See Ertimur et al. (2011) for the effectiveness of vote no campaigns related to executive pay. 
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shareholders. In today's difficult economic environment I believe that these expenses should not 
be taken lightly, even for large companies.” NYSE Rule 452 does allow broker discretionary 
voting on routine matters, such as the ratification of independent auditors. In line with this 
observation, Glass Lewis & Co state in their comment letter that “we believe companies can 
resolve [achieving quorum without relying on broker votes for director elections] by providing 
shareholders a vote on another routine voting item such as ratification of auditors.” To examine 
whether companies are now more likely to provide shareholders a vote on auditor ratification, we 
collect the items on the ballot from the company filings in SEC Edgar. Panel C shows the results. 
The number of items on the ballot has increased since 2009. However, most companies in our 
sample did already have an additional routine matter (next to uncontested director elections) on 
the ballot in 2009. After 2009, the auditor ratification is on the ballot for 99% of the firms in our 
sample. 
 Of the 407 firms in our sample, 179 firms have a classified board at some point during 
the period 2009-2011. With a classified board, shareholders can only vote on a fraction (typically 
one third) of the members of a board of directors in a single year. Consequently, comparing 
voting outcomes over the years is more informative for firms without classified boards. As a 
robustness test, we examine voting outcomes for the 228 firms that did not have a classified 
board at any point during the period 2009-2011. Panel D of Table III shows the results. 
 It can be seen that for firms without classified boards, the average number of directors 
that can be voted on is 11. We find that approval rates are also high for firms without classified 
boards. We observe an approval rate of 93.9% in 2009, 95.4% in 2010, and 95.8% in 2011. 
 
VI. Market Response to the Adjustments in Rule 452 
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Although voting outcomes in 2010 and 2011 do not seem to be strongly affected by the 
rule change, the possibility remains that the new regulation affects voting outcomes further in the 
future, or that the change in regulation is value relevant for firms in other ways, for example by 
improving the effort exercised by directors to act in shareholders’ best interests. To examine 
these possibilities, we study the effect of the elimination of discretionary broker voting in 
uncontested director elections on shareholder value.  
NYSE Rule 452 is a member rule, which implies that a rule change applies not only to 
companies listed on the NYSE, but also to companies whose stock is held for customers by 
member firm broker-dealers. As a result, virtually every listed U.S. firm is affected by Rule 452, 
which requires careful thinking about selecting a control group. We construct two control groups 
to examine the wealth effects for firms affected by Rule 452. First, we follow Zhang (2007) and 
Akyol et al. (2012) by using a global market index that excludes U.S. stocks. Overall correlation 
between the global market index and U.S. market returns is high, and an abnormal return for the 
U.S. portfolio compared to the world index on Rule 452 event days can provide insight into the 
wealth effects of Rule 452. As our second benchmark, for events occurring after May 23, 2007, 
we use the returns of firms registered under the Investment Act of 1940. After an amendment of 
Rule 452 on May 23, 2007, it was completely clear that firms registered under the Investment 
Act of 1940 would be exempt from the change in Rule 452.24 
To account for the cross-sectional correlation in stock return residuals due to each event 
occurring on the same calendar date for all affected firms, we use a version of the event study 
                                                 
24Akyol et al. (2012) also use the Canadian stock market index as a benchmark index. Canadian firms are not an 
appropriate control group for Rule 452, since meetings of both U.S. and Canadian reporting issuers have been 
marked by the NYSE as eligible for discretionary voting under Rule 452 (Lando, 2009). The change in Rule 452 
will not affect other foreign private issuers because they were not historically eligible for discretionary voting under 
Rule 452. 
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methodology of Schipper and Thompson (1983). In this model, the dependent variable is the 
return on a portfolio p consisting of the 457 stocks in our sample: 
ݎ௣௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵݎ௠,௧ ൅෍ߛ௣௘
ா
௘ୀଵ
ܦ௘ ൅ ߝ௣௧,																																																																								ሺ2ሻ 
where rpt  is the day t return on the equally-weighted portfolio p; rm,t is the contemporaneous 
return of the control group; and εpt  is the error term. De is a dummy variable equal to one for any 
event e that increases the probability of disallowing broker discretionary voting for uncontested 
director elections, equal to minus one for any event e that decreases this probability, and equal to 
zero otherwise.  
We obtain firms’ stock returns from CRSP and obtain the times series data of the Dow 
Jones Global ex-U.S. Composite Index from Reuters. We estimate the Schipper and Thompson 
model for the period from July 30, 2002 until July 31, 2009. Our main event window is [-1, 1]. 
Table IV shows the results. 
 
[  Table IV here ] 
 
Panel A shows the overall wealth effects when using the global index. For the global 
index, we modify the Schipper and Thompson (1983) specification by including lead and lagged 
market returns, which overcomes the potential bias that follows from non-synchronous trading 
due to time differences between countries in our global market index. 
It can be seen from the estimation results in Panel A of Table IV that the overall reaction 
to the change in Rule 452 is not statistically significant when we use the global index as our 
control group. The coefficient of the daily abnormal return is close to zero and the p-value is 
0.804. To examine the wealth effects in more detail, Panel B of Table IV reports the abnormal 
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returns for our sample firms per event. In Panel B, De equals one for one particular event at a 
time. We indicate whether an individual event increases or decreases the probability of a rule 
change by using the information in Table I. We find that there is no statistically significant 
abnormal return for our sample firms on any of the nine event days when we use the global index 
as a benchmark. Furthermore, the signs of the coefficients are not very consistent. For the seven 
events that increase the probability that Rule 452 will be modified, we find four events with a 
positive sign and three events with a negative sign. 
In March 2007, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) sent 
a letter to its members in which it encourages brokers that do not receive voting instructions from 
some customers to vote those customers' shares in proportion to the voting instructions the 
broker receives from its other customers, a practice known as proportional voting. As a result, 
various large brokerage firms, like Schwab, Ameritrade, Morgan Stanley, Merrill 
Lynch and Goldman Sachs had moved to proportional voting before the 2009 proxy season 
(Sanati, 2009). Because the implementation of proportional voting is likely to reduce the impact 
of Rule 452, Panel C examines the combined wealth effects of events before and after March 
2007. We find that there are no significant wealth effects of changes in regulation in broker 
discretionary voting, even when brokers had not yet moved to proportional voting.  
In Panel D of Table IV we use the equally-weighted returns of a sample of 372 listed 
companies that fall under the Investment Act of 1940 as a benchmark index. We obtain this 
sample by collecting closed-end funds from CRSP.25 We only include those events that occur 
after it became absolutely clear that companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 
1940 would be exempt from the exclusion of broker discretionary voting in uncontested director 
                                                 
25 Closed-end funds have a CRSP share code of 14. 
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elections, which happened on May 23, 2007, when the SEC filed the Amendment to the proposed 
rule outlining the exemption. 
In Panel D, we find a negative overall wealth effect that is weakly statistically significant. 
When we examine the events separately in Panel E, we find only a statistically significant effect 
for event 8, relating to the date that the rule was put up for comments. The effect of this event on 
abnormal stock returns is negative. Note that this event occurs in 2009, i.e. after implementations 
of broker proportional voting, and in a year in which markets were very volatile and many crisis-
related announcement were made. We list potentially confounding events on our event dates in 
Table V. 
 
[  Table V here ] 
 
The potentially confounding events are based on the Business & Finance section of the 
Wall Street Journal on the day after the event, which provides a short discussion of the market’s 
performance on the previous day. Of course, there is always some news on a particular day, and 
the events reported in Table V are not necessarily problematic for our study if they affect both 
our control groups and firms on the S&P 500 in a similar manner. It can however be seen that on 
several days there are confounding events that are likely to affect the firms in our sample 
differently than the firms in our control groups, like bank-related government interventions on 
event #8. We therefore have to be careful in drawing strong conclusions from the wealth effects 
on a single event in 2009.  
 
 [  Table VI here ] 
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In Table VI we consider alternative event windows. We find no significant overall wealth 
effects on days [0, 1], [0, 3] and [-15, 1] around the events. Overall, our main conclusion is that 
there is no strong evidence that the change in Rule 452 was either value decreasing or value 
increasing for shareholders. 
 
VII. Cross-Sectional Effects and Abnormal Returns for Small Firms 
Although overall wealth effects might be insignificant, a subsample of firms may be 
affected by the change in Rule 452. In this section, we examine this possibility in three ways. 
First, we examine the impact of firm characteristics on the cross-sectional abnormal returns on 
event days. Second, we examine the relation between abnormal returns and the percentage of 
investors that actively support the rule change. Third, we examine the abnormal returns of a 
sample of small cap firms. 
 
A. Cross-sectional effects 
The change in Rule 452 is not likely to affect all firms to the same extent. For example, 
firms with relatively low percentages of broker discretionary votes are likely to be relatively 
unaffected by the rule change, whereas firms with high percentages of broker discretionary votes 
should expect stronger effects. We examine the effect of eight variables on the cross-sectional 
abnormal returns during the nine events related to a change in Rule 452. These variables are the 
following: 
 
Percentage of broker discretionary votes. The change in Rule 452 is likely to be more relevant 
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for firms with a higher percentage of broker discretionary votes. 
Approval rate. We predict that the change in Rule 452 is more relevant for firms in which 
average approval rates are low, since the likelihood of a director being voted off the board 
is higher for these firms. 
Institutional ownership. When controlling for the percentage of broker discretionary votes, firms 
with high institutional ownership are more likely to be affected by the rule change since 
the elimination of the broker vote facilitates the exertion of “voice” by institutional 
investors, for instance, through vote no campaigns.   
Majority voting. For a given percentage of approval votes, the probability of a director being 
removed from the board is highest with a majority voting standard and lowest with a 
plurality voting standard, with the plurality-plus-resignation voting standard being in 
between. 
Entrenchment index. The empowerment of shareholders is likely to be more relevant for firms in 
which shareholder rights are currently relatively low, which is indicated by a relatively 
high score on the entrenchment index. 
Return on assets. The impact of the rule change is higher when the probability of shareholder 
activism is higher, which is more likely when the firm is performing poorly. 
Firm size. Several comment letters argue that especially small firms will be affected by the rule 
change, as they would have to expend a disproportionate amount of additional resources 
to solicit shareholder votes to obtain a quorum. 
Industry competitiveness. The relevance of the rule change can depend on the availability of 
alternative governance mechanisms, like industry competitiveness. Giroud and Mueller 
(2010) and Huang and Peyer (2011) suggest that standard governance mechanisms such 
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as boards or takeovers might not matter for firms in industries with high product market 
competition.26 
 
For cross-sectional analyses, Sefcik and Thompson (1986) provide a weighting procedure 
that controls for cross-correlation and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity in firm residuals. We 
follow their procedure and form a matrix F that has a column of ones and P-1 columns of 
characteristics. In our case, P equals nine as we examine eight firm characteristics. We then form 
P sets of portfolio weights and compute the portfolio returns for each set of weights as follows: 
'
1
'
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'
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 (3) 
where W = P x N matrix of portfolio weights 
 '
pW  = pth row of portfolio weights 
 F = N x P matrix; F = [1 X2 X3. . . XP] 
We obtain the return on portfolio p on day t by 'pt p itR W R  , in which Rit is an N x 1 
vector of individual firms’ stock returns on day t. Finally, we run p portfolio time-series 
regressions by using Equation 2. We use the global index as the benchmark, thus including lead 
and lagged returns, and consider all nine events. The estimates from the regressions reflect the 
                                                 
26 Giroud and Mueller (2010) study the introduction of anti-takeover legislation and find that it does not affect the 
performance of firms in competitive industries. Huang and Peyer (2011) show that the introduction of the 
NASDAQ/NYSE independent board requirement following Sarbanes-Oxley has no effect on the value of firms in 
competitive industries. 
'pt pitR WR
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effect of each firm characteristic on the market reaction to each event, while controlling for the 
effects of other firm characteristics.  
 
[ Table VII here ] 
 
Table VII reports the results. We use four different event windows. For the [-1, 1] event 
window, we do not find that firms with relatively high percentages of broker discretionary votes 
have different abnormal returns around Rule 452 event dates than firms with relatively low 
percentages of broker discretionary votes. In fact, very few of the variables that we examine have 
a statistically significant effect on the abnormal returns during the period [-1, 1]. These findings 
are in line with the relatively small value relevance of Rule 452, although we have to 
acknowledge the possibility that confounding events on our event dates create noise in our 
wealth effect analyses. 
When considering alternative event windows, we again fail to find strong effects of most 
of our variables. Only one variable has a statistically significant impact at the 5% significance 
level: we find a negative effect of institutional ownership on the abnormal returns during the 
event window [-1, 1]. This finding would be in line with firms that are potentially more affected 
by the change in Rule 452 having more negative wealth effects. However, given that this result is 
not corroborated by the other variables in our model, we have to conclude that overall we find 
little evidence of the change in Rule 452 being value relevant. 
 
B. Activist investors supporting the rule change   
 A number of investors have written comment letters to the SEC to support the elimination 
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of broker votes in uncontested director elections. In this subsection we examine whether these 
investors’ shareholdings are informative on whether the change in Rule 452 is value relevant. 
After examining all comment letters, we obtain seven investors that specifically expressed their 
support of the rule change. These are California Public Employees' Retirement System 
(CalPERS), California State Teachers' Retirement System (CalSTRS), State Board of 
Administration of Florida (SBA), Hermes Fund Managers (Hermes), Colorado Public 
Employees' Retirement Association (Colorado PERA), Teachers Insurance and Annuity 
Association and College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), and Ohio Public Employees 
Retirement System (OPERS). We obtain the shareholdings of these investors from the Thomson 
Reuters’ 13-F filings database. When combining the shareholdings of the seven activist investors, 
we find that they have shareholdings in all 457 firms. The average combined ownership is 0.87%, 
with a minimum of 0.34% and a maximum of 1.69%. 
We examine whether the combined shareholdings are correlated with the abnormal 
returns around event dates. We include the percentage of activist ownership into the cross-
sectional analysis of Section VII.A, and find no statistically significant relation between the 
percentage ownership of the seven activist investors and abnormal returns on event dates (the 
coefficient is 10.286 and the p-value is 0.618).27 
As a second test we examine the determinants of firms’ investors explicitly expressing 
their support for the rule change. Of particular interest is whether shareholders of firms with 
relatively high percentages of broker votes are more likely to support the rule change. We use 
regression specifications in which activist ownership is the dependent variable, and the 
                                                 
27 Instead of the percentage ownership by the seven activist investors (i.e. the combined ownership of all seven 
activist investors), we have included the number of activist investors per firm, the maximum percentage by a single 
activist investor per firm, and the average ownership of the seven activist investors per firm. Our results are robust to 
these different measures of activist ownership.  
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percentage of broker votes is one of the explanatory variables. We examine both the combined 
shareholdings of activist investors in a firm and the number of activist investors in a firm, and 
cluster standard errors by two-digit SIC codes. Table VIII shows the results.  
 
[   Table VIII here ] 
 
 Model 1 of Table VIII shows that firms with higher percentages of broker votes in 2009 
have a larger percentage of shareholders that explicitly express their support for the rule change. 
Model 2 shows that the percentage of broker votes is also positively related to the number of 
shareholders in a firm that explicitly express their support for the rule change. These findings are 
interesting as they suggest that investors who believe that broker votes should be eliminated are 
actually investing more in firms that have relatively high percentages of broker votes. The 
findings are in line with investors becoming activists when they feel they have most to gain from 
activism, similar to confrontational activism campaigns by hedge funds that buy large stakes in a 
publicly held corporation with the intention to bring about change and thereby realize a profit on 
the investment (see for example Klein and Zur, 2009). 
 
C. Small firms   
Table VII shows no significant relation between firm size and changes in a firm’s wealth 
when the rules regarding broker discretionary voting change. All firms in our sample are 
however relatively large, which follows from our choice to focus on S&P 500 firms. Several 
comment letters refer to the potential importance of the change in Rule 452 for relatively small 
firms. For example, a letter by American Express Company states: “removing the broker vote for 
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the thousands of newer and smaller companies that have high percentages of retail ownership 
will create significant difficulties for those companies in conducting their shareholder meetings 
in an environment of low retail voting activity. It will likely increase the costs of uncontested 
elections as these companies will have to spend more money and effort to reach retail holders to 
urge them to vote and it will shift disproportionate weight to institutional investors or special 
interest groups who may have their own agendas.”   
  
[  Table IX and X here ] 
 
We examine overall wealth effects for the 600 firms in the S&P Small Cap Index in 
Tables IX and X.28 Table IX shows the results with event window [-1, 1] and Table X shows the 
results with alternative event windows. We find an overall effect in Table IX that is negative but 
not statistically significant at the 10% level with the global index, but that is statistically 
significant at the 10% level with the investment company index as a benchmark. This provides 
weak evidence that the marginal investor of the firms in the small cap index views the change in 
Rule 452 as costly. Again, however, this result appears mostly driven by event 8, as Panel B and 
D of Table IX show that other events have no significant wealth effects. In addition, the 
alternative event windows, as reported in Table X, provide no evidence for a wealth effect of the 
change in Rule 452 on small firms.    
As a final test, we examine the voting outcomes for small firms. We choose 100 firms 
from the 600 firms in the S&P small cap index by first deleting all firms with classified boards at 
the 2009 fiscal year-end (leaving 257 firms), and then selecting those 100 firms with the highest 
                                                 
28 The typical firm’s total asset size at the 2009 fiscal year-end for this sample is $768 million. 
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percentage of non-institutional ownership, as we expect that the percentage of broker non-votes 
will be high in these firms. For this relatively small sample, we collect data from 2006 to 2011, 
to also test whether voting outcomes are changing over longer time periods, without relying too 
much on the 2009 fiscal year. We have 80 firms with data in all of these years, and the results for 
these firms are shown in Table XI. 
 
[   Table XI here ] 
 
Approval rates are also high for small firms. In most years, the average approval rate is 
close to 95%. Note that we observe the lowest average approval rate in 2009, with a percentage 
of 92.6%. In 2010 we observe the highest percentage of directors receiving a minority of votes, 
when 1.5% of directors fail to obtain a majority of votes. But we do not find strong evidence that 
voting outcomes are significantly different before and after the change in broker discretionary 
voting. We do find convincing evidence that firms are increasingly putting auditor ratification 
items on the ballot: in 2006 only 72% of the firms ratify their auditor, whereas this percentage is 
almost 99% in 2011.   
 
VIII. Conclusion 
Many current attempts to reform financial markets presume that shareholder empower-
ment is in fact beneficial to shareholders. One recent change in regulation that empowers share-
holders is the elimination of broker voting in uncontested director elections. This change oc-
curred after pressure from shareholder activists, proxy advisory firms, and the New York Stock 
Exchange, and removes votes that brokers would typically cast in favor of management.  
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We contribute to the literature on the effects of governance regulation by examining vot-
ing outcomes, no vote campaigns, and items on the ballot after the change in regulation. We fur-
ther contribute to the literature by examining overall and cross-sectional wealth effects on the 
dates that new information on broker voting regulation was released to the market. Besides ana-
lyzing overall effects, we thus also consider those firms that are expected to be mostly affected 
by the rule change. Overall, we do not find a convincing effect of the rule change on shareholder 
value, not even for those firms that seemed to be mostly targeted by the new rule. Moreover, the 
probability that a particular director would be voted off the board has not increased since the rule 
change. 
One potential explanation for these findings is that the elimination of broker voting is just 
one step in the direction of increasing shareholder power in the director selection process, which 
is insufficient in isolation. An additional step that has been increasing in popularity is the imple-
mentation of a majority voting standard. A next step that arguably needs to be taken is the educa-
tion of (retail) investors, as the low impact of the rule change may be due to poor voter turnout 
caused by a lack of awareness or information on the part of retail shareholders. In the end, share-
holder empowerment is not only about changing regulations, but about the percentage of inves-
tors actually making the effort to voice their opinions by voting. However, given the absence of 
wealth effects for even those firms in which we expect the strongest impact of the new rule, it 
appears that shareholders do not view the elimination of broker votes as an important first step, 
and are not convinced that other, more value relevant, steps will be taken.  
Another potential explanation is that the SEC, the NYSE, shareholder activists, and proxy 
advisory firms believed they acted in the best interest of investors but simply misjudged the ef-
fectiveness of the regulation ex-ante. Our finding that activist investors own more shares in firms 
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with higher percentages of broker votes is in line with this explanation, as activist investors 
might have expected the strongest effects in these firms. A strong argument against this explana-
tion is the simplicity with which one can calculate the small effect that eliminating broker votes 
would have on the historically very high approval rates. We find that excluding broker votes, 
which in our sample represent 12% of the votes cast in 2009, would decrease the average ap-
proval rate by only one percent.  
A more plausible explanation for our findings is that broker votes are not of substantial 
importance and that outside pressure has been an important factor in the SEC’s decision to 
change regulation. A desire of proxy advisory firms and shareholder activists to demonstrate vig-
ilance could explain why they strongly supported the change in regulation, even if this change 
was unlikely to be effective. Our findings show that recent discussions about for example the 
elimination of broker non-votes in say-on-pay votes would appear to be unwarranted. Our results 
suggest that it is of interest to study in more detail the incentives and potential biases in decision 
making within the SEC, the NYSE, shareholder activists, and proxy advisory firms.  
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Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Histogram of the percentage of non-instructing shareholders voting after the rule 
change. 
 
This figure shows a histogram of the estimated percentage of non-instructing shareholders before the rule change that 
vote after the rule change. The horizontal axis represent the bins. The vertical axis represents the percentage of our 
observations that falls in a particular bin.    
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Table I. Events Related to Broker Voting 
This table presents an overview of important regulatory and legislative events related to broker voting. The events are 
obtained by an extensive search in Factiva, Google, and the SEC’s website. The last column reports whether the 
event increases or decreases the likelihood of federal proxy access regulation. 
Event # Event Date Event Description Regulation 
Likelihood 
1 July 30, 2003 Broker voting lands on the SEC’s radar screen Increases 
2 November 17, 2004 Early Dow Jones Newswire Increases 
3 April 25, 2005 First NYSE Working Group meeting Increases 
4 June 5, 2006 Recommendations of Working Group 
published 
Increases 
5 October 24, 2006 Rule proposed to the SEC Increases 
6 September 28, 2007 Reports on postponement Decreases 
7 May 21, 2008 Press reports about proposal being stuck Decreases 
8 February 26, 2009 Rule published for comment by SEC Increases 
9 July 1, 2009 Rule approved by SEC Increases 
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Table II. Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for our sample of 457 firms. The data are from the 2009 fiscal year. Votes cast 
are reported in millions of votes. Percentage of discretionary broker votes is the number of discretionary broker votes 
divided by total votes cast. The approval rate is the percentage of votes being in favor of a director. We calculate the 
average approval rate per firm. The synthetic approval rate is the percentage of votes being in favor of a director when 
broker discretionary votes would not have counted. We calculate the average synthetic approval rate per firm. The 
synthetic decrease in approval rate is the approval rate minus the synthetic approval rate. Firm size is total assets and 
is reported in millions of dollars. Return on assets is measured by the ratio of operating income before depreciation to 
total assets. Institutional ownership is the proportion of outstanding shares held by institutional owners at the end of 
2009. The entrenchment index counts the number of provisions a firm has out of the following six: staggered boards, 
limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers 
and charter amendments. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is the sum of the squared market shares of firms based on 
three-digit SIC codes. Majority voting equals one for a majority voting standard, zero for a plurality voting standard, 
and 0.5 for a plurality-plus-resignation voting standard. 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Total votes cast (in millions) 554 246 1,077 11 12,409 
Percentage of discretionary  
broker votes 0.121 0.107 0.065 0.001 0.441 
Approval rate 0.931 0.960 0.082 0.490 0.997 
Synthetic approval rate 0.921 0.953 0.093 0.429 0.996 
Synthetic decrease in approval 
rate 0.010 0.005 0.014 0.000 0.110 
Firm size (in millions $) 52,559 11,848 194,279 680 2,223,299 
Return on assets 0.128 0.118 0.088 -0.242 0.655 
Institutional ownership 0.847 0.865 0.132 0.312 1.000 
Entrenchment index 3.562 3.000 1.183 0.000 6.000 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.187 0.148 0.173 0.019 1.000 
Majority voting 0.663     
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Table III. Voting Outcomes for the Period 2009 – 2011 
This table presents voting outcomes for a sample of 407 firms for which we could find voting results 
in 2009, 2010, and 2011. We report the averages per year. The approval rate is the percentage of votes 
being in favor of a director. The percentage of directors receiving a minority of votes is the average of 
the number of directors receiving less than 50% favorable votes divided by the number of directors on 
the ballot over all firms. Votes cast are reported in millions of votes. The percentage of vote no 
campaigns is the percentage of firms with a vote no campaign against one or more of its directors. The 
percentage with auditor ratification on the ballot is the percentage of firms that include the ratification 
of the auditor on the ballot. In Panel D we only consider those 228 firms that do not have a classified 
board. Difference of means t-statistics relate to the difference between 2009 and the period 2010-2011, 
with equal variances not assumed. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance level, respectively. 
 2009 2010 2011 Difference of means t-statistic 
 
Panel A: Approval Rates 
Approval rate 0.928 0.949 0.952 -4.710*** 
Number of directors on ballot 7.826 8.079 8.233 -1.383 
Percentage of directors receiving 
minority of votes 0.545% 0.019% 0.386% 1.076 
Total votes cast (in millions) 537 495 492 0.683 
 
Panel B: Vote No Campaigns      
Percentage of vote no campaigns 0.737% 1.720% 0.246% -0.449 
     
Panel C: Items on Ballot 
Number of items on ballot 3.894 3.931 5.602 -7.193*** 
Percentage with auditor ratification 
on ballot 0.975 0.993 0.988 -1.717* 
     
Panel D: Firms without a Classified Board 
Total votes cast (in millions) 745 682 678 0.588 
Approval rate 0.939 0.954 0.958 -3.503*** 
Number of directors on ballot 10.711 10.702 10.724 -0.012 
Percentage of directors receiving 
minority of votes 0.388% 0.034% 0.031% 1.584 
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Table IV. Wealth Effects of Changes in Rule 452 
This table presents daily abnormal returns around events related to changes in the rules for broker discretionary 
voting. The event window is [-1, 1]. In Panel A, we report overall daily abnormal returns of our sample of S&P 500 
firms on the nine event dates as reported in Table I, with a global index (the Dow Jones Global Ex. U.S. index) as 
benchmark. In Panel B, we report the abnormal returns per event. Panel C shows the overall wealth effects before 
and after March 2007 with the global index as a benchmark. Panel D and E show daily abnormal returns when we 
use the returns of companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 as a benchmark. We report the 
overall daily abnormal returns in Panel D and the daily abnormal returns per event in Panel E. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Panel A. Overall Wealth Effects 
 Global Index 
    Coefficient p-value 
Daily abnormal return   -0.001 0.804 
Market return (t)   0.581*** 0.000 
Market return (t-1)   -0.157*** 0.000 
Market return (t+1)   0.532*** 0.000 
Intercept   0.000 0.407 
 
Panel B. Wealth Effects per Event 
 Likelihood Global Index 
      Coefficient p-value 
Event #1 Increases 0.003 0.681 
Event #2 Increases -0.002 0.752 
Event #3 Increases 0.000 0.964 
Event #4 Increases 0.004 0.594 
Event #5 Increases 0.001 0.931 
Event #6 Decreases -0.002 0.798 
Event #7 Decreases -0.002 0.736 
Event #8 Increases -0.010 0.133 
Event #9 Increases -0.004 0.539 
 
Panel C. Overall Wealth Effects before and after March 2007 
 Global Index 
 Before March 2007 After March 2007 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Daily abnormal return 0.000 0.877 -0.002 0.604 
Market return (t) 0.473*** 0.000 0.626*** 0.000 
Market return (t-1) -0.074*** 0.008 -0.191*** 0.000 
Market return (t+1) 0.430*** 0.000 0.567*** 0.000 
Intercept 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.682 
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Panel D. Overall Wealth Effects after May 23, 2007 
 Investment Company Index 
    Coefficient p-value 
Daily abnormal return -0.006* 0.096 
Market return (t) 1.149*** 0.000 
Intercept 0.000 0.668 
 
Panel E. Wealth Effects per Event 
 Likelihood Investment Company Index 
      Coefficient p-value 
Event #6 Decreases 0.001 0.916 
Event #7 Decreases -0.005 0.516 
Event #8 Increases -0.019** 0.013 
Event #9   Increases -0.010 0.168 
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Table V. Confounding Events 
This table presents potentially confounding events, which are obtained from the Business & 
Finance section of the Wall Street Journal on the day after the event date. 
Event date Event # Daily overview 
July 30, 2003 1 
The economy showed signs of a budding recovery led by the 
manufacturing sector, a Fed study of regional economies 
said; Stocks fell and bonds rallied to end a four-day slide. 
The industrials fell 4.41 to 9200.05; the Nasdaq shed 10.46 
to 1720.91. 
November 17, 2004 2 
Consumer prices rose 0.6% in October, the largest increase 
in five months. The data could affect the Fed's decisions on 
interest-rate policy in coming months; The Dow industrials 
finished up 61.92 points at 10549.57 after the heating-oil 
news checked an earlier surge. Bond prices jumped. 
April 25, 2005 3 
The Dow industrials rose 84.76 points to 10242.47 on news 
of unexpectedly strong home sales and a drop in oil prices to 
$54.57. 
June 5, 2006 4 
The Dow Industrials tumbled 199.15 points, or 1.77%, to 
11048.72 after an inflation warning by Bernanke stoked 
fears of further rate increases. The Nasdaq slid 2.24% to 
2169.62. Treasurys also fell, pushing the yield on the 10-
year note to 5.024%. Oil settled up 27 cents at $72.60 after 
surging earlier on an Iranian threat of a supply disruption; 
Fed rate increases have boosted the yields on some money-
market funds and short-term Treasury bills to more than 5%, 
their highest level since 2001. 
October 24, 2006 5 
The Dow industrials set another record, edging up 10.97 
points to 12127.88 in advance of the Fed rate decision; 
Bonds and oil prices rose. 
September 28, 2007 6 
The world economy may be able to cope with oil prices of 
$100 a barrel if certain conditions are met. Crude, 
meanwhile, fell $1.22, or 1.5%, to $81.66; The Dow 
industrials fell 17.31 points to 13895.63, but gained 3.6% 
for the quarter. Gold hit a 27-year intraday high, while 
wheat prices set a record; The Fed's preferred inflation 
gauge rose 1.8% in August from a year earlier, the smallest 
increase since February 2004. 
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May 21, 2008 7 
Oil prices surged $4.19, or 3.3%, to a record $133.17 a 
barrel in New York, helping drive down the Dow industrials 
for the second straight day; The Dow fell 227.49 points, or 
1.8%, to 12601.19; The Federal Reserve's hints that it won't 
further cut interest rates also weighed on stocks; The Fed 
lowered its expectations for the economy, reflecting the 
housing downturn and credit crunch as well as rising food 
and energy prices, April minutes showed. 
February 26, 2009 8 
Government intervention will allow sagging global banking 
titans Citigroup and Royal Bank of Scotland to remain 
standing. Citigroup is close to a deal for the U.S. to 
significantly increase its stake in exchange for boardroom 
changes. In London, the U.K. government agreed to pump 
billions of pounds into RBS, taking it to the brink of 
nationalization; Stocks started strong but cooled off, sending 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average down 1.2%, to 7182.08; 
Fannie Mae posted a $25.2 billion loss for the fourth quarter, 
and similar expectations for Freddie Mac paint a worsening 
outlook; Durable-goods orders plunged in January while 
new-home sales and data on unemployment worsened. 
July 1, 2009 9 
The three biggest car makers in America called a bottom to 
the long decline in U.S. auto sales as the industry reported 
its smallest monthly sales drop this year. New-vehicle sales 
fell 28% in June from a year earlier. Meanwhile, GM will 
file for an initial public offering of shares sometime next 
year, according to a timetable laid out in a U.S. bankruptcy 
court; Declines in manufacturing activity slowed last month, 
indicating that the sector could see growth in the second half 
of the year; Stocks began the quarter with gains after the 
latest economic news; The Dow industrials rose 57.06 
points, or 0.7%, to 8504.06, led by Kraft. 
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Table VI: Alternative Event Windows 
This table presents daily abnormal returns around events related to changes in the rules for broker discretionary 
voting. The event windows are [0, 1], [0, 3], and [-15, 1]. We report overall daily abnormal returns of our sample of 
S&P 500 firms on the nine event dates as reported in Table I when we use a global Index (the Dow Jones Global Ex. 
U.S. index) as benchmark, and on the last four of our events when we use the returns of companies registered under 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 as a benchmark. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance level, respectively. 
  Coefficient p-value 
  
Panel A: Event Window [0, 1] 
Global Index 0.002 0.531 
Investment Company Index -0.006 0.182 
Panel B: Event Window [0, 3] 
Global Index 0.000 0.946 
Investment Company Index -0.003 0.382 
Panel C: Event Window [-15, 1] 
Global Index 0.000 0.642 
Investment Company Index -0.001 0.468 
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Table VII. Cross-Sectional Abnormal Returns 
This table presents the results from the cross-sectional analysis. Event parameters are based on Sefcik and 
Thompson (1986). We regress the abnormal returns on seven firm characteristics. Data are from the 2009 fiscal year. 
Percentage of discretionary broker votes is the number of discretionary broker votes divided by total votes cast. The 
approval rate is the percentage of votes being in favor of a director. We calculate the average approval rate per firm. 
Majority voting equals one for a majority voting standard, zero for a plurality voting standard, and 0.5 for a 
plurality-plus-resignation voting standard. The entrenchment index counts the number of provisions a firm has out 
of the following six: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and 
supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. Institutional ownership is the proportion of 
outstanding shares held by institutional owners at the end of 2009. Return on assets is measured by the ratio of
operating income before depreciation to total assets. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index is the sum of the squared market shares of firms based on three-digit SIC codes. 
Coefficients are multiplied by 100. p-values are provided in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
  [-1, 1] [0, 1] [0, 3] [-15, 1] 
Percentage of broker 
discretionary votes 
-0.167 -0.935 -0.893* 0.182 
(0.754) (0.150) (0.053) (0.421) 
Approval rate -0.110 -0.117 0.215 -0.020 
(0.714) (0.748) (0.407) (0.876) 
Majority voting 0.015 -0.029 -0.033 -0.008 
(0.808) (0.702) (0.538) (0.772) 
Entrenchment index -0.021 -0.049 -0.010 -0.011 
(0.401) (0.110) (0.650) (0.303) 
Institutional 
ownership 
-0.776** -0.833* -0.590* -0.043 
(0.026) (0.051) (0.052) (0.774) 
Return on assets 0.070 -0.475 0.018 -0.125 
(0.907) (0.517) (0.972) (0.624) 
Firm size -0.012 -0.026 0.021 -0.006 
(0.807) (0.668) (0.627) (0.775) 
Herfindahl-
Hirschman index 
-0.356* -0.159 -0.024 -0.041 
(0.085) (0.531) (0.894) (0.642) 
Intercept 0.960 1.625** 0.253 0.200 
(0.133) (0.038) (0.649) (0.463) 
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Table VIII. Determinants of Shareholders Expressing their Support for a Rule Change 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regression models estimating the relation between activist ownership and the 
cross-sectional variables from Table VII. Activists are investors expressing their support for eliminating broker votes 
in comment letters to the SEC, which are California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), California 
State Teachers' Retirement System (CalSTRS), State Board of Administration of Florida (SBA), Hermes Fund 
Managers (Hermes), Colorado Public Employees' Retirement Association (Colorado PERA), Teachers Insurance 
and Annuity Association and College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), and Ohio Public Employees 
Retirement System (OPERS). The dependent variable in Model 1 is the percentage shareholdings of activist 
investors in a firm (in which 1% ownership gives a value of 1). The dependent variable in Model 2 is the number of 
activist investors in a firm. We report standard errors clustered by two-digit SIC codes in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 
   Activist Ownership  Number of Activists 
Percentage of broker 
discretionary votes 
0.235** 0.976* 
(0.119) (0.533) 
Approval rate -0.075 0.110 
(0.086) (0.248) 
Majority voting 0.012 0.185** 
(0.018) (0.088) 
Entrenchment index 0.006 -0.031 
(0.008) (0.031) 
Institutional ownership 0.509*** -0.188 
(0.116) (0.274) 
Return on assets 0.031 2.357*** 
(0.098) (0.378) 
Firm size 0.013* 0.224*** 
(0.007) (0.027) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index -0.104 0.122 
(0.082) (0.201) 
Intercept 0.340** 1.939*** 
(0.146) (0.331) 
  
N    457   457 
R2 0.131 0.304 
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Table IX. Wealth effects of Changes in Rule 452 for Small Firms 
This table presents daily abnormal returns around events related to changes in the rules for broker discretionary 
voting. The event window is [-1, 1]. In Panel A, we report overall daily abnormal returns of our sample of small cap 
firms on the nine event dates as reported in Table I, with a global Index (the Dow Jones Global Ex. U.S. index) as 
benchmark. In Panel B, we report the abnormal returns per event. Panel C and D show daily abnormal returns when 
we use the returns of companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 as a benchmark. The events 
that we consider are events 6, 7, 8, and 9 of Table I. We report the overall daily abnormal returns in Panel C and the 
daily abnormal returns per event in Panel D. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance level, respectively. 
Panel A. Overall Wealth Effects for Small Firms 
 Global Index 
  Coefficient p-value 
Daily abnormal return -0.002 0.566 
Market return (t) 0.529*** 0.000 
Market return (t-1) -0.105*** 0.000 
Market return (t+1) 0.588*** 0.000 
Intercept 0.000 0.464 
 
Panel B. Wealth Effects per Event for Small Firms 
 Likelihood Global Index 
    Coefficient p-value 
Event #1 Increases 0.009 0.290 
Event #2 Increases -0.003 0.742 
Event #3 Increases -0.004 0.640 
Event #4 Increases 0.000 0.970 
Event #5 Increases 0.000 0.996 
Event #6 Decreases -0.001 0.923 
Event #7 Decreases 0.003 0.741 
Event #8 Increases -0.012 0.140 
Event #9 Increases -0.003 0.753 
 
Panel C. Overall Wealth Effects after May 23, 2007 for Small Firms 
 Investment Company Index 
  Coefficient p-value 
Daily abnormal return -0.008* 0.091 
Market return (t) 1.127*** 0.000 
Intercept 0.000 0.712 
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Panel D. Wealth Effects per Event for Small Firms 
 Likelihood Investment Company Index 
    Coefficient p-value 
Event #6 Decreases 0.002 0.819 
Event #7 Decreases 0.000 0.999 
Event #8 Increases -0.021** 0.025 
Event #9 Increases -0.009 0.367 
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Table X: Alternative Event Windows for Small Firms 
This table presents daily abnormal returns around events related to changes in the rules for broker discretionary 
voting. The event windows are [0, 1], [0, 3], and [-15, 1]. We report overall daily abnormal returns of our sample of 
small cap firms on the nine event dates as reported in Table I when we use a global Index (the Dow Jones Global Ex. 
U.S. index) as benchmark, and on the last four of our events when we use the returns of companies registered under 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 as a benchmark. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance level, respectively. 
  Coefficient p-value 
Panel A: Event Window [0, 1]   
Global Index 0.002 0.606 
Investment Company Index -0.005 0.237 
Panel B: Event Window [0, 3] 
Global Index -0.002 0.512 
Investment Company Index -0.005* 0.094 
Panel C: Event Window [-15, 1] 
Global Index 0.001 0.649 
Investment Company Index -0.001 0.298 
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Table XI. Small Firms’ Voting Outcomes 
This table presents voting outcomes for a sample of 80 small cap firms for which we could find voting 
results from 2006 until 2011. We report the averages per year. Votes cast are reported in millions of 
votes. The approval rate is the percentage of votes being in favor of a director. The percentage of 
directors receiving a minority of votes is the average of the number of directors receiving less than 
50% favorable votes divided by the number of directors on the ballot over all firms. The percentage 
with auditor ratification on the ballot is the percentage of firms that include the ratification of the 
auditor on the ballot. Difference of means t-statistics relate to the difference between the period 2006-
2009 and the period 2010-2011, with equal variances not assumed. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Difference 
of means t-
statistic 
        
Approval rate 0.949 0.953 0.938 0.926 0.941 0.948  -0.359 
Number of directors on ballot 7.734 7.627 7.692 7.795 8.063 8.183  -1.789* 
Percentage of directors 
receiving minority of votes 
0.543% 0.133% 0.855% 0.362% 1.512% 0.376%  -0.836 
Total votes cast (in millions) 31 33 34 37 33 38  -0.651 
Number of items on ballot 2.430 2.347 2.646 2.684 2.600 4.521  -7.832*** 
Percentage with auditor 
ratification on ballot 
0.722 0.800 0.873 0.924 0.963 0.986  -5.734*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
